Are Iranian drones redefining warfare in West Asia?

n Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War’, he states, “If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” With Iran targeting over 200 ballistic missiles at Israel, the strategic ball is firmly in the court of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Both Iran and Hezbollah are leveraging this overwhelming tactic to breach Israeli air defences. Iran is clearly aware of its strengths and its adversaries’ vulnerabilities, particularly in the realm of unmanned aerial systems — drones — that it seeks to deploy to gain the upper hand in the West Asian war theatre.
One domain where many analysts concede Iran’s competitive edge is its unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones. While experts argue that Iran’s capabilities may not match the advanced technological prowess of the United States or Israel, their innovative approaches have consistently defied Western expectations.
Take, for instance, the drone and missile assault in September 2019 on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais, which momentarily disrupted 5 per cent of the global oil supply. Initially claimed by the Houthis, Saudi officials attributed the attack to drones originating from the north, implicating Iran. Though unnamed at the time, these drones would later be identified as Shahed 131s.
This mysterious delta-wing drone resurfaced in July 2021, targeting the Israeli-owned tanker Mercer Street, although Iran only acknowledged the new drone technology months later, alongside the development of an enhanced Shahed-136 variant.
Since these pivotal incidents, it has become increasingly evident that Iranian-supplied drones are reshaping the dynamics of warfare in West Asia.
Commander Rahul Verma (Retd.), an Emerging Technology and Prioritisation Scout at a leading Indian multinational corporation, emphasizes that the Iranian strategy centers around cost-effectiveness. “The aim of an Iranian drone is to keep production economical,” he explains. “When they struck Saudi oil facilities in 2019, the focus was not on crafting high-end drones but on manufacturing them in large numbers. The question is whether you invest in expensive combat capabilities or opt for cheaper drones that might force the enemy to expend more costly resources to neutralize them.”
He points out that the Shahed drones—129 and 136—operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), cost around USD 20,000 each to produce. The missiles needed to destroy these drones, however, are significantly pricier. Reflecting on the 2011 downing of a US RQ-170 Sentinel by Iranian forces, Commander Verma notes that this event sparked Iran’s reverse-engineering efforts, ultimately establishing a supply chain leveraging second-hand resources from countries like China and North Korea. It was reported that an Iranian drone shot down in Ukraine had a navigational component produced in China. “Drones serve as a viable alternative to guided missiles,” he adds.
“The economic toll of defensive measures, such as the Iron Dome and other air defense systems, could eventually drain Israel’s resources,” Commander Verma (Retd.) asserts. He also points out that while the Iron Dome has proven effective against a range of projectiles, Israel continues to refine its defense capabilities to address evolving threats. So, the overall impact of Iranian drones would depend on strategic planning, execution, and Israel’s countermeasures.
In recent developments, Iranian-backed militias have increasingly employed drones against US military and diplomatic sites in Iraq and Syria since 2021, with Iranian-designed drones accounting for at least 20 per cent of these attacks. Following the outbreak of conflict between Hamas and Israel on October 7, 2023, drone strikes targeting locations in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan surged. Additionally, Iran has supplied hundreds of drones to Russia since 2022, which have been used in assaults on both civilian and military targets in Ukraine. Russia, in turn, has begun to replicate Iranian drone models domestically.
“Iranian precision-guided missiles are as accurate as any, but their drone technology introduces the concept of ‘cheap warfare,’ with drones designed to strike targets without the frills of sophistication,” notes strategy and foreign policy expert Qamar Agha. “Despite US sanctions and technological access challenges, Iran has found ways to adapt and innovate. After the Iran-Iraq War, Iran sought self-reliance, reducing dependence on external resources while fostering crucial partnerships with Russia and China, using assets like its gold mines and oil reserves to bolster its drone and defense initiatives.”
Iran’s drone arsenal is a striking showcase of diverse capabilities:
Suicide Drones: Iran has ten diverse models of suicide drones designed to explode upon impact. These drones can achieve precision rivaling that of ballistic missiles, all while flying under the radar—literally. The Shahed-136, for example, is a smaller drone with a payload of under 45 kilograms (about 100 pounds) of explosives. On the other hand, the Meraj-521 carries just 3 kilograms (6.6 pounds) of explosives. While many of these drones are slower and easier targets for anti-aircraft defence, their ranges vary dramatically—from a mere 5 kilometers (3 miles) to a formidable 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles). The giants of this category, like the Arash series, can carry nearly 260 kilograms (575 pounds) of explosives and reach distances of 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles), making them a serious threat on the battlefield.
Combat and Surveillance Drones: There are over a dozen combat drones capable of striking ground, sea, or air targets before returning to base. The Shahed-149, one of the larger models, boasts a range of 2,000 kilometres (1,240 miles) and can carry up to 500 kilograms (1,100 pounds) of munitions or electronic gear.
Many of Iran’s combat drones also double as surveillance platforms, equipped to gather intelligence through photos and video footage while marking targets for bombers, fighter jets, or other drones. For more nimble operations, Iran employs smaller surveillance-only drones like the Hodhod-1, which operates within a limited range of just 30 kilometres (18 miles) and can stay airborne for only a couple of hours.
Agha elaborates on Israel’s strategic outlook: “Israel has historically approached conflict with a short, decisive strategy (6-7 days). In contrast, Iran aims for prolonged engagements that could jeopardise American interests in the region and disrupt global oil supplies.”
As General Kenneth McKenzie, a former head of US Central Command, expressed in a paper for the Washington Institute, “Drones pose the most immediate threat to Middle East security due to their low cost, widespread availability, and potential deniability—thanks to their convoluted flight paths.” He warned that Iranian technology marks an “inflection point in aerial warfare—akin to the dawn of manned flight over a century ago—disrupting US air superiority over its forces and installations.”